Delist dormant markets: wanPYUSD, wanEURC, wanDAI, USDM-USDA Minswap LP

Type Market lifecycle
Author Claude Opus 5.5 + Gpt 6.1 Sol
Data as of 2026-10-23 (Liqwid API, Koios on-chain, DefiLlama)

1. Summary

Four markets have had no real activity for 90+ days:

  • They hold $2,690 of supply in total.
  • The three bridged markets have seen no new loans in 90 days. The LP market saw a single $293 loan in that time.
  • In that time they accrued $0.19 of interest combined.

Each one still uses oracle feeds, batching transactions, infrastructure, audit scope, and bridge-risk monitoring. This proposal winds them down in an orderly way. Withdrawals and repayments are never blocked.

2. Selection Criteria (all must hold for ≥ 90 days)

  1. Average supply below $5,000.
  2. No new borrowing demand: borrows flat or zero. The USDM-USDA LP market had one small loan, but it is included because its collateral pool is dead (§4).
  3. Borrowing is enabled, so the market is not collateral-only by design.
  4. No active launch or incentive program.

3. Evidence: 365 Days of Liqwid History

3.1 Snapshots (USD)

Market 365d ago 180d ago 90d ago 30d ago Today
wanPYUSD supply / borrow 104 / 0 144 / 0 84 / 0 84 / 0 84 / 0
wanEURC supply / borrow 135 / 31 138 / 33 133 / 0 134 / 0 132 / 0
wanDAI supply / borrow 67,244 / 39,120 3,734 / 1,883 2,919 / 11 2,041 / 11 2,041 / 11
USDM-USDA LP supply / borrow (not listed) 0 / 0 243 / 0 433 / 293 434 / 154

3.2 Activity and revenue per window

Market Window Avg supply Max borrow Avg util. Interest accrued Origination fees
wanPYUSD 90d $84 $0 0.00% $0.00 $0.00
365d $106 $30 0.01% $0.17 $0.30
wanEURC 90d $134 $0 0.00% $0.00 $0.00
365d $139 $33 0.12% $1.96 $0.00
wanDAI 90d $2,268 $11 0.01% $0.14 $0.00
365d $20,594 $39,814 0.28% $1,769 $5.05
USDM-USDA LP 90d $406 $293 0.33% $0.05 $0.00
since listing (2026-03-12) $244 $293 0.13% $0.05 $0.00

What the history shows:

  • wanPYUSD and wanEURC have had zero borrows for 90 days. Their supply has stayed flat at a few dozen dollars all year.
  • wanDAI was a real market a year ago ($67k supplied, $39k borrowed). It has shrunk 97% since. All 10 remaining loans together owe 14.8 DAI.
  • USDM-USDA LP has accrued $0.05 of interest in its entire listed life. Today it has a single borrower.

For comparison: the wanUSDC market accrued $21,036 of interest over the same 90 days, at 70% average utilization.

4. The Minswap USDM-USDA Stable Pool Is Dead

The collateral behind this market is USDM-USDA-SLP (policy 5f0d38b3…15bd6, asset1f5mt5gjl4dtgmglpzeuk0n694yayax0nwzrjuv). Its on-chain mint/burn history tells the story:

Date LP supply (units) Implied pool TVL
2025-06-21 (peak) ~12.0T $12.15M
2026-01-23 10.05T $10.16M
2026-02-23 3 withdrawals of ~1.65–1.86T each —
2026-04-26 1.87T $1.89M
2026-05-18 → 06-05 the last large LPs exit —
2026-07-25 0.75B $757
Today 0.876B $885
  • TVL fell 99.99% from its peak. The pool has held under $1k since June 2026.
  • There are 8 holders in total. About 429M units (49% of all LP tokens) are supplied on Liqwid. That makes Liqwid’s market the main remaining user of a pool nobody else uses.
  • The token is unsafe as collateral: a liquidator cannot exit a pool with $885 of depth. Its price comes from reserves that nobody trades against.

Method: implied TVL = LP supply × Liqwid oracle LP price ($1.0101 per 1M units). The pool is a stableswap, so that price barely moves. Mint/burn history comes from Koios asset_history.

5. The Cost of Running a Market

Cost Detail Grows with
Oracle feeds One price feed per asset, plus depeg monitoring for bridged assets Markets × update rate
Batching Each market settles in its own batch transactions. Every candidate batched in the last 24h, paying Cardano fees and needing keeper uptime. Markets × batches/day
Min-ADA / UTxOs State and action UTxOs lock ADA and add script contention Markets
Off-chain stack Indexer, API, frontend, analytics, alerting Markets
Upgrades & audits Every protocol release must migrate and test every market Markets × releases
Risk & governance Bridge monitoring, collateral and cap reviews, incident response Assets + bridge exposure

Revenue vs cost (90 days): $0.19 of interest accrued, against [core team: oracle $/feed/mo, batcher ADA/day/market, infra, amortized audit]. The core team should publish these per-market figures before the vote.

6. Counterpoints

6.1 “EURC and PYUSD are growing. Don’t drop them now.”

Globally, both assets are growing (DefiLlama):

Asset Supply 2025-10 Supply 2026-10 YoY Chains Supply on Cardano (wan-bridged) Of which on Liqwid
EURC $239M $506M +112% 13 ≈ $200 66%
PYUSD $2.76B $2.93B +6% (peak $3.69B in Jan) 19 ≈ $199 42%
DAI $5.14B $4.75B −8% 49 ≈ $7,984 26%

EURC more than doubled across 13 chains over the year, yet Cardano still holds about $200 of it. Growth elsewhere has not reached Cardano through Wanchain. Liqwid already holds most of the tiny Cardano float, so the market can’t grow from inside Cardano either.

How to handle it: delisting can be reversed. If a native or canonical EURC/PYUSD issuance arrives on Cardano, for example a Circle- or Paxos-backed deployment, it can be listed fresh with a better risk profile than a bridged wrapper.

6.2 Bridge risk is real, as the Wanchain exploit showed

  • On 20–21 Jul 2026, the Wanchain Cardano↔BNB bridge was exploited.
    • The attacker drained about 515M NIGHT, roughly 97% of the bridge’s NIGHT reserves, worth an estimated $9–13M.
    • BlockSec traced the root cause to a signature-reuse flaw in the bridge’s TreasuryCheck validator.
    • NIGHT fell 30–40%. Wanchain paused the affected routes, including the wanUSDC route. [attach Wanchain notice]
  • All three bridged candidates (wanPYUSD, wanEURC, wanDAI) share the Wanchain policy 25c5de5f…f935. Their value depends entirely on Wanchain’s custody and validators.
  • For a wrapped stablecoin that nobody borrows, bridge risk is all downside and earns nothing. A frozen or drained bridge leaves Liqwid holding a depegged asset, possibly as collateral, plus an incident to manage.

6.3 “Then why keep wanUSDC and wanUSDT?”

They share the same bridge, but the economics are different. wanUSDC and wanUSDT carry about $894k of supply at 86–89% utilization and earn real revenue. Their bridge risk is paid for. The candidates’ bridge risk is not. Reviewing bridge concentration for wanUSDC and wanUSDT (caps, collateral factors, a path to native assets) is out of scope here and deserves its own proposal.

6.4 “$2.7k is too small to bother with.”

The size is exactly the point: delisting costs almost nothing in user impact, while each market keeps adding to operating and audit costs indefinitely.

7. Not Proposed

Market Reason
AGIX, COPI, WMT Already delisting
SNEK2, STRIKE, LQ, POL Borrow cap 0: collateral-only by design
SNEK2-USDCx, STRIKE-USDCx, SNEK2-ADA Recent isolated pairs. Review in 90 days
ETH, IAG, ERG, MIN, SHEN, STRIKE-ADA Small but borrowing is active. Watchlist

8. Specification

For PYUSD, EURC, DAI, USDM-USDA-MINSWAP-LP-STABLE:

  1. Day 0: set delisting = true. Block new supply and new borrows. Remove as collateral for new loans.
  2. Days 0–30: repay, withdraw, and liquidate as usual. Show a front-end banner and announce on all channels.
  3. Day 30: lower collateral factors step by step to close the remaining positions (10 dust wanDAI loans and 1 LP loan).
  4. Day 60: stop the oracle feeds and batching. Keep a claim path for withdrawals open for at least 12 months.

9. Reproducibility

Every figure in this proposal can be regenerated from public endpoints (scripts available on demand):

Script Source Produces
markets.mjs Liqwid liqwid.data.markets Snapshot table
history.mjs Liqwid analytics.marketHistory(interval: DAY) §3 tables
lp_onchain.mjs Koios asset_info, asset_history, asset_addresses §4
stables.mjs, wan_supply.mjs DefiLlama stablecoins API + Koios §6.1
charts.mjs All of the above Charts

10. Vote

  • FOR: delist the four markets as specified.
  • AGAINST: keep all markets as they are.
  • ABSTAIN