3 Proposals to improve LQ becoming a better value token

LQ strategy | Becoming a value token

Since the publication of the initial article outlining the utility and vision of LQ, the Core Team has consistently emphasized its goal of creating a value token that offers passive income to LQ holders. This income stems from the margin interest derived from revenues generated by the lending products available on Liqwid.

In the initial phase, spanning from the launch of Liqwid in February 2023 to the present day, the protocol has successfully onboarded users who also serve as stakeholders, thanks to its market incentives and staking rewards.

As of today, the Liqwid protocol stands as the premier lending protocol on Cardano. However, overpaying for liquidity poses a significant risk, causing the LQ price to depreciate in comparison to ADA. This trend not only hampers the value creation potential for long-term holders but also jeopardizes Liqwid DAOs Safety Module which is the protocol’s LQ allocated to backstop the system in the event of any Shortfall Event. This means a focus on LQ liquidity and reduction in emissions must be embarked upon at some point, 14 months post Liqwid v1 and with the upcoming full v2 mainnet launch, this moment feels like a logical next step to implement these very necessary changes.

The below graphic represents the different imbrications and impacts of the LQ value and the LQ incentives.

Analysis of the last 12 months

As observed in the data available on the governance forum (see Liqwid Protocol - Data analystics over the last 12 months), the yield farming program, characterized by incentives for both suppliers and borrowers, succeeded in attracting liquidity. However, this achievement came at the expense of the LQ price and its holders.

Such inflationary measures are inherently unsustainable over prolonged periods, posing a threat to the value proposition of the Liqwid protocol and jeopardizing the development trajectory of the LQ price for the LQ holders, and impeding the addition of LQ as a collateral market on Liqwid.

It’s crucial to recognize that liquidity in Cardano is finite, leading to market inefficiencies where increased rewards fail to correlate with supply expansion or revenue growth for Liqwid.

While acknowledging the role of the yield program in rewarding early adopters and suppliers, it’s imperative to understand that these incentives are today not indispensable as Liqwid is the current leading lending protocol on Cardano.

Liqwid’s primary objective remains centered on generating value for LQ holders, with yield farming serving merely as a mean to foster liquidity and expand the ecosystem.

To this end, 3 proposals should be voted to create a better environment for the LQ holders:
1. Modification of the market incentives reward system
2. Modification of the staking reward incentive system
3. Modification of programmatic reward incentive system

1. Modification of the market incentives reward system

In light of these analyses and market dynamics (see here), we recommend voting on the following proposals:

  1. Stop immediately the borrower rewards from LQ 20’000 per month to zero.
  2. Reduce immediately the supplier rewards from LQ 100’000 per month to LQ 25’000.
  3. Allocate 50% of the suppliers’ rewards per markets based on the interest repaid, 50% of the suppliers’ rewards per markets based on the interest accrued.

Here below is an example of the calculations for the point 3).

Note: This system includes also some market multiplicators that can be activated at any time, and modify the values for accrued interests and repaid interest.

Conclusion:
In light of these analyses and market dynamics, we recommend modifying the market incentives reward system as proposed here above.

These changes would take place immediately after the vote if passed.

2. Modification of the staking reward incentive system

The LQ staking rewards are being decreased, following the decision to reduce the overall LQ inflation, as it is driving the LQ price down.

Therefore, the amount of staking rewards will be based solely on an annual rate of 5% for everyone (applicable to every stake and for every user). It’s important to note that the wallets of the Core Founding Team Members are excluded from the staking incentive and have until now not received any staking rewards.

The staking base rate can be improved with the use of an Aquafarmers on the Liqwid platform (as it is already existing today).

Aquafarmer boost on the Staking base rate:

  • Common | 4%
  • Rare | 6%
  • Very Rare | 8%
  • Legendary | 10%

Example:
John has staked 100 LQ during 1 month, and has a rare Aquafarmer.
After one month (30 days), he can claim: 100 LQ * ( 5% (1+ Aquafarmer boost | 6% )) * (period in days/365);

Results = 100 LQ * (5% *1.06) * (30/365) = 0.4356 LQ

Implementation date for this proposal if passed: (edit of 30 March 2024)
Since the original proposal to introduce the 50% APY after 12 months was voted on April 24, 2023, we propose to conclude it by the end of June 2024. Consequently, early stakers will receive rewards for three months before it ceases. (This includes the month of April, May and June).

Conclusion:
In light of these analyses and market dynamics, we recommend modifying the staking rewards incentives as proposed here above.

3. Modification of programmatic reward incentive system

The current programmatic rewards encompass all protocol cash flows distributed to LQ stakers.

Currently, the allocation for these rewards is solely based on the amount of LQ staked, but this will be adjusted to provide increased rewards for long-term LQ stakers. It’s important to note that the wallets of the Core Team are excluded from this calculation.

With the new system, all the stakes older than 6 months (and below 1 year) will be eligible for a boost of 3x, while all the stakes older than 1 year will be eligible for a 5x boost on the total amount of LQ stakes taken into account to allocate the programmatic distribution.
(Edit:16.04.2024: After consideration, 10x/6x/1x is way too big and discourage any new joiners, while it should be the main incentive to buy LQ token to profit from the passive income. Also, an end date is added to this feature - 31.Dec. 2024. The DAO can vote later to create a new mechanism or not, but the “early joiners” boost cannot be held for ever.)

Example: John has 3 LQ stakes on Liqwid and we are calculating the Staking boost in date of March 28,2024.

A Date of Staking Staking boost LQ tokens staked LQ tokens eligible for programmatic distribution
Stake 1 03.03.2023 5x 100 500
Stake 2 30.06.2023 3x 50 300
Stake 3 02.01.2024 1x 40 40
Total 190 840

The allocation of the programmatic rewards for all the LQ stakers is based on the modified staked LQ amounts after the boost. The programmatic rewards are also distributed monthly.

Note: A similar system has been put in place in Minswap and created positive impacts on the tokens price. They also cut the MIN inflation to reward the liquidity suppliersby a factor of 3 to 6x last year.

Conclusion:
In light of these analyses and market dynamics, we recommend modifying the programmatic rewards incentives as proposed here above.

General summary and “big picture” comment:

In conjunction with the anticipated reduction in LQ inflation and the implementation of the Liqwid v2 protocol, which includes a loan origination fee with revenues split evenly between the DAO and LQ stakers, we anticipate a significant improvement in the value proposition for LQ stakers. This dual approach is expected to induce a supply shock, consequently leading to an increase in the value of LQ tokens. Furthermore, the reduction in LQ inflation is poised to facilitate the listing of LQ as collateral on Liqwid.

It’s worth noting that the introduction of a Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL) pool would further enhance LQ price stability and overall returns, as detailed in the accompanying post.

As discussed in this POL post, the creation of an ADA-LQ pool necessitates ADA funding, which could be facilitated by borrowing ADA backed by LQ collateral from the Liqwid DAO treasury.

These three proposals are interconnected, and their simultaneous execution is crucial for achieving the desired effects, effectively addressing multiple objectives through a unified approach aimed at reducing LQ inflation and improving LQ price.

  • Yes, I support the proposal 1) Modification of the market incentives reward system as stated in the post?
  • No, I do not support the proposal 1).
  • Yes, I support the proposal 2) Modification of the staking reward incentive system (5% base rate) as stated in the post?
  • No, I do not support the proposal 2).
  • Yes, I support the proposal 3) Modification of programmatic reward incentive system as stated in the post?
  • No, I do not support the proposal 3).
0 voters
2 Likes

with regards to 1, and taking 3 into account if its passed, id like the 50/50 split of rewards to interest repaid accrued to be more heavily in favour of repaid interest.

with regards to 2, as a staker with only 30% of my main LQ stake earning 50% APR it’s definitely a big change to my strategy. I get why the change is needed, I will adjust accordingly if passed.

with regards to 3, I dont think I’m a fan yet.

programmatic rewards are finite amount per month based on 10% of interest repaid, if my understanding is right with the stake boosts it would mean the ADA rewards per LQ staked would be diluted heavily reducing any new stakers ada rewards whilst 2 would heavily reduce LQ rewards also.

haven’t yet voted, waiting for some discussion before i do.

2 Likes

I don’t believe that the staking reward system’s emissions significantly contribute to driving down the price of LQ. This is because users who are earning the 30% or 50% staking rewards have chosen to stake their LQ rather than selling them. Can someone please clarify the reasoning behind point #2 in this proposal, particularly concerning the impact on “driving the LQ price down”?

5 Likes

Regarding point #2, I don’t see a necessity for a change. It seems illogical to suggest that users who have opted for long-term staking of their LQ, rather than selling them, are the ones “driving the LQ price down”.

3 Likes

I came to a different conclusion. Loan origination fee will dampen borrow demand, which is why supply and borrow incentives are needed.
Reducing staking rewards might unlock a great portion of LQ, thus driving price down further.
I would propose to wait with such drastic changes until after loan origination fee and V2 has been rolled-out. If V2 is successful and manages to bring in new users and capital the incentives can be adjusted.

7 Likes

Utilisation of USDT, DJED and USDC has been beyond the kink point consecutively for many months.

  1. How will this proposal contribute to increasing the supply of assets for the above over-utilised markets? Provide evidence to support your response.
  2. What is your analysis of the LQ APY for suppliers before and after the activation of this proposal in the three mentioned markets above?
  3. Will suppliers in the above-mentioned over-utilised markets receive more or fewer LQ tokens per month? Please provide evidence or analysis for both before and after the proposal’s activation.
  4. How will reducing LQ for suppliers down to a quarter of previous magnitude in a single proposal assist in increasing supply in over-utilised markets?
3 Likes

this proposal is making changes to improve the value of LQ.

only point1 of this proposal has an impact of market rewards and therefore utilisation of markets.

although your 4th question, i guess removing 75% of supplier rewards would make it less profitable to remain accruing large amounts of interest at high rates, as a result we may see utilisation come down from interest repaid.

1 Like

I think I have not understood it correctly because I have understood that:

Proposal 2 is to dishonestly defraud old stakers with whom an APR was agreed upon if they staked their LQ for more than a year but once that year they break their word.

Of course, if that is what Johnny Sachs is proposing, we would have to ask him if he has taken into account the moral value of dishonesty in his proposal.

I am clear about what to do with my LQ if something like this is done in any company where I have my tokens. I would send a photo to Discord so it could be seen.

Your proposal is totally dishonest Johnny. Something like that can only destroy value.

3 Likes

[quote=“AliD, post:6, topic:1551, full:true”]
Utilisation of USDT, DJED and USDC has been beyond the kink point consecutively for many months.

1. How will this proposal contribute to increasing the supply of assets for the above over-utilised markets? Provide evidence to support your response.

Current markets in Cardano are inefficient, meaning that increasing the supplier rewards by +X% will not necessarily generate an increase in supply by +Y%, as would be expected in rational and efficient markets. In efficient markets, the increase in supply (Y%) would typically exceed the increase in rewards (X%).

The current supply in these markets is inelastic. Interest rates have been increased (by 50% at a Utilization Rate of 80%). Until more stablecoins are introduced to Cardano or these loans are liquidated, these markets are expected to remain over-utilized.

The situation may change a bit next week when we reduce the NumAction, and suppliers may withdraw assets, potentially driving the Utilization Rate and interest rates even higher.

2. What is your analysis of the LQ APY for suppliers before and after the activation of this proposal in the three mentioned markets above?

I anticipate that the LQ price will rise. While I cannot precisely quantify the extent of the price increase, it is anticipated that the decrease in LQ quantity will be offset by an increase in the LQ price.
Furthermore, these three votes are integral to a larger plan, as elucidated in the initial graph and the final comment on my post.

3. Will suppliers in the above-mentioned over-utilised markets receive more or fewer LQ tokens per month? Please provide evidence or analysis for both before and after the proposal’s activation.

As the interest rates are now higher for the over-utilised markets, it means that the amounts of accrued interests will also be bigger. If these markets stay as they are, compared to the other markets, and only based on a accrued interest calculation, yes, they should have more LQ .

  • iUSD: Borrowed $5’081k x 16.21% = $823k (annualized)
  • USDC: Borrowed $2’134k x 45.99% = $981.42k

4. How will reducing LQ for suppliers down to a quarter of previous magnitude in a single proposal assist in increasing supply in over-utilised markets?
[/quote]

Refer to my answer 1).

1 Like

I understand your surprises, because I did not mention the expected date to have this current staking program being reduced (while I mention “immediately” for the suppliers & borrowers rewards).

To my eyes, the staking APR will be reduced at the end of JUNE 2024 (giving the month of March, April, May and June normally) and then being reduced. It means that early stakers would have 3 months for sure at 50%.

Note: I have edited the proposal and include the 30.06.2024 as date to change the staking program.

You should have raised this 12 months ago so that it is not considered a scam in its entirety. I would throw all my LQ into the market when the time comes and wait patiently for a Liqwid Finance competition to emerge while dedicating my LQ investment to others like FACT where the core team does not make dishonest pitches to early investors.

The 3 months that you propose are a lack of respect for intelligence

1 Like

For now I interrupt my strategy of buy DCA LQ

I can’t buy LQ if I wouldn’t trust to buy a used car

1 Like

I dont agree, you are saying long term staker are married with the protocol and will not sell ?

1 Like

What you just said would make sense if you lower the staking reward percentages to 1.25%/7.5%/12.5% for 0/6/12 month tenure periods + ADA reward increase proposed in the proposal number 3

Assuming you reduce market share rewards x4

1 Like

1 year ago, I announced what would happen with mass LQ inflation. You are read the information there. People always tends to focus on the free lunch instead of understanding the big picture.

This current proposal is made in the interests of all LQ buyers and long-term holders who care about the success of the Liqwid protocol.

Early holders have already been massively rewarded and will benefit from a 3-month return at 50% APY. Additionally, what you are alluding to in your argument is the fact that reducing LQ issuance will benefit all holders with a price increase, while LQ revenues are also expected to increase. Also, the early LQ stakers have also a big boost on the programmatic rewards (see proposal #3).

Also, I cannot read anything reading your overall strategy of the LQ price, including POL, financing and many other topics.

If you think you can come up with a better plan, you are welcome. We are here all keen to read your throughts?

1 Like

In response to “Operation Shitstorm”

1 Like

Here it is

What you just said would make sense if you lower the staking reward percentages to 1.25%/7.5%/12.5% for 0/6/12 month tenure periods + ADA reward increase proposed in the proposal number 3

Assuming you reduce market share rewards x4

This is a proportional adaptation to new facts. It is not such a hard blow to the first investors while the central team increases its rewards in ADA by 10 without losing anything in return

1 Like

@FlorianVolery firstly, thanks for your response.

Are you willing to increase the interest rates again if borrowing does not fall below the kink point 1 month after the NumAction has been changed? Evidently, if borrowers aren’t repaying to reduce borrowing below the kink point then interest rates must be increased again for over-utilised assets, as the 2nd slope isn’t high enough. Does the protocol intend to take this action to reduce borrowing in over utilised markets to protect its suppliers and promote further supply? Or at least further reward them in higher APY by +Y%?

If the current markets in Cardano are acknowledged as inefficient, the proposal to offer LQ rewards for suppliers in markets of interest accrued and repaid might seem contradictory at first glance. However, the logic behind offering these rewards likely stems from the need to incentivize participation and liquidity provision despite market inefficiencies. Inefficient markets may require additional incentives to encourage desired behaviors, such as supplying liquidity. By offering LQ rewards, there’s an attempt to stimulate liquidity provision even in an environment where traditional market dynamics might not apply as expected.

Suppliers will receive less LQ rewards per month overall in number, but the LQ token price will be higher than before offsetting some of the loss in USD term rewards. Is this your strategy?

  1. Will measures be implemented to safeguard against farm/recursive borrowing for farming LQ? For instance, participants supplying ADA might purposefully borrow ADA to exploit accrued and repaid interest LQ rewards. It’s crucial to have a system in place to prevent such wallets from benefiting from such farming actions.
1 Like

UPDATED: 31/03/2024

I have now voted(Yes to Point 1, No to Point 2, Yes to Point 3)

I believe the biggest problem is not that staking is reducing, its that the time spent to reach these APR’s now feels as it was for nothing as the proposal point2 would reward us with programmatic rewards, which would be further diluted from the low amount they currently are due point3.

id like to propose an Amendment to part 2. @FlorianVolery @DC1

Honour all current stakes(and sub-stakes) from the date & time the proposal passes. No LQ should be allowed to be added to the honoured stakes(and sub-stakes). Honoured stakes keep 50% APR for maximum 1 year, to realise the 50% APR as promised.

If, after calculations the LQ required to pay the 50% APR of honoured stakes the LQ staking allocation of tokenomic is depleted, I propose 2.5% of total supply from DAO allocation & 2.5% from User Distributions be reallocated to fund staking for all new stakes going forward.

Any new stakes from the date proposal passes would not follow the 5%/30%/50%. They would have a base rate of 5% and follow the below proposed reward mechanism for LQ staking.

As part of this change, I also propose a change to the mechanics for Aquafarmer(AF) NFT staking boost. The current mechanics for AF NFT’s boost a stake as follow’s “Stake x ( Staking Rate % x AF Tier %)”.

A common AF with base 5% is 5% x 4% = 5.2% APR

This change would be for the AF boost % being added to the Staking Rate rather than multiplied, as follows Stake x ( Staking Rate % + AF Tier %).

Eample of rates for a new staker with each AF tier and 5% base rate are as follows;

Common(6700) - 5% + 4% = 9%
Rare(2200) - 5% + 6% = 11%
Super Rare(1000) - 5% + 8% = 13%
Legendary(100) - 5% + 10% = 15%

Most long term stakers are assumed to be AF holders and this gives a proportional boost for each AF tier, for which many in the community have felt AF’s value sub par to the protocol they are tied to.

Do you agree with the above changes and these replacing part2 of the current proposal?

  • Yes, I agree with these changes to Staking and AF Boost.
  • No, I disagree with these changes to Staking and AF Boost.
0 voters
2 Likes

It is even worse than the one Florian Valery proposes. It is not designed for long-term staking. It’s another bad joke. I’m sorry. Only those who sell the LQ they receive can like it

1 Like