# Delist dormant markets: wanPYUSD, wanEURC, wanDAI, USDM-USDA Minswap LP

**URL:** <https://gov.liqwid.finance/t/delist-dormant-markets-wanpyusd-waneurc-wandai-usdm-usda-minswap-lp/2019>\
**Category:** Temperature Check\
**Created:** [October 23, 2026, 12:37pm UTC](https://gov.liqwid.finance/t/delist-dormant-markets-wanpyusd-waneurc-wandai-usdm-usda-minswap-lp/2019 "2026-10-23T12:37:25Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![gil](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9fc29f/32.png) [@gil](https://gov.liqwid.finance/u/gil)\
**Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 12:37pm UTC](https://gov.liqwid.finance/t/delist-dormant-markets-wanpyusd-waneurc-wandai-usdm-usda-minswap-lp/2019/1 "2026-10-23T12:37:25Z")

</div>

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Type | Market lifecycle |
| Author | Claude Opus 5.5 + Gpt 6.1 Sol |
| Data as of | 2026-10-23 (Liqwid API, Koios on-chain, DefiLlama) |

## 1. Summary

Four markets have had no real activity for 90+ days:

- They hold **$2,690** of supply in total.
- The three bridged markets have seen no new loans in 90 days. The LP market saw a single $293 loan in that time.
- In that time they accrued **$0.19** of interest combined.

Each one still uses oracle feeds, batching transactions, infrastructure, audit scope, and bridge-risk monitoring. This proposal winds them down in an orderly way. Withdrawals and repayments are never blocked.

## 2. Selection Criteria (all must hold for ≥ 90 days)

1. Average supply below **$5,000**.
2. No new borrowing demand: borrows flat or zero. The USDM-USDA LP market had one small loan, but it is included because its collateral pool is dead (§4).
3. Borrowing is enabled, so the market is not collateral-only by design.
4. No active launch or incentive program.

## 3. Evidence: 365 Days of Liqwid History

### 3.1 Snapshots (USD)

| Market | 365d ago | 180d ago | 90d ago | 30d ago | Today |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **wanPYUSD** supply / borrow | 104 / 0 | 144 / 0 | 84 / 0 | 84 / 0 | **84 / 0** |
| **wanEURC** supply / borrow | 135 / 31 | 138 / 33 | 133 / 0 | 134 / 0 | **132 / 0** |
| **wanDAI** supply / borrow | 67,244 / 39,120 | 3,734 / 1,883 | 2,919 / 11 | 2,041 / 11 | **2,041 / 11** |
| **USDM-USDA LP** supply / borrow | (not listed) | 0 / 0 | 243 / 0 | 433 / 293 | **434 / 154** |

### 3.2 Activity and revenue per window

| Market | Window | Avg supply | Max borrow | Avg util. | Interest accrued | Origination fees |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| wanPYUSD | 90d | $84 | $0 | 0.00% | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| | 365d | $106 | $30 | 0.01% | $0.17 | $0.30 |
| wanEURC | 90d | $134 | $0 | 0.00% | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| | 365d | $139 | $33 | 0.12% | $1.96 | $0.00 |
| wanDAI | 90d | $2,268 | $11 | 0.01% | $0.14 | $0.00 |
| | 365d | $20,594 | $39,814 | 0.28% | $1,769 | $5.05 |
| USDM-USDA LP | 90d | $406 | $293 | 0.33% | $0.05 | $0.00 |
| | since listing (2026-03-12) | $244 | $293 | 0.13% | $0.05 | $0.00 |

**What the history shows:**

- **wanPYUSD and wanEURC** have had zero borrows for 90 days. Their supply has stayed flat at a few dozen dollars all year.
- **wanDAI** was a real market a year ago ($67k supplied, $39k borrowed). It has shrunk 97% since. All 10 remaining loans together owe 14.8 DAI.
- **USDM-USDA LP** has accrued $0.05 of interest in its entire listed life. Today it has a single borrower.

 ![chart_supply](https://canada1.discourse-cdn.com/flex010/uploads/liqwid/original/1X/f7a68a4e01edde2cc08b3aa998117f9397ed65f4.png)

 ![chart_borrow](https://canada1.discourse-cdn.com/flex010/uploads/liqwid/original/1X/515898b976731945b3ac21733dc89a2c87c325e3.png)

**For comparison:** the wanUSDC market accrued **$21,036** of interest over the same 90 days, at 70% average utilization.

## 4. The Minswap USDM-USDA Stable Pool Is Dead

The collateral behind this market is `USDM-USDA-SLP` (policy `5f0d38b3…15bd6`, `asset1f5mt5gjl4dtgmglpzeuk0n694yayax0nwzrjuv`). Its on-chain mint/burn history tells the story:

| Date | LP supply (units) | Implied pool TVL |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2025-06-21 (peak) | ~12.0T | **$12.15M** |
| 2026-01-23 | 10.05T | $10.16M |
| 2026-02-23 | 3 withdrawals of ~1.65–1.86T each | — |
| 2026-04-26 | 1.87T | $1.89M |
| 2026-05-18 → 06-05 | the last large LPs exit | — |
| 2026-07-25 | 0.75B | $757 |
| **Today** | **0.876B** | **$885** |

- **TVL fell 99.99%** from its peak. The pool has held under $1k since June 2026.
- **There are 8 holders in total.** About 429M units (49% of all LP tokens) are supplied on Liqwid. That makes Liqwid’s market the main remaining user of a pool nobody else uses.
- **The token is unsafe as collateral:** a liquidator cannot exit a pool with $885 of depth. Its price comes from reserves that nobody trades against.

 ![chart_minswap_pool](https://canada1.discourse-cdn.com/flex010/uploads/liqwid/original/1X/466139b15eae5034d807b54fd7b3be0b7bcbb06b.png)

_Method:_ implied TVL = LP supply × Liqwid oracle LP price ($1.0101 per 1M units). The pool is a stableswap, so that price barely moves. Mint/burn history comes from Koios `asset_history`.

## 5. The Cost of Running a Market

| Cost | Detail | Grows with |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Oracle feeds | One price feed per asset, plus depeg monitoring for bridged assets | Markets × update rate |
| Batching | Each market settles in its own batch transactions. Every candidate batched in the last 24h, paying Cardano fees and needing keeper uptime. | Markets × batches/day |
| Min-ADA / UTxOs | State and action UTxOs lock ADA and add script contention | Markets |
| Off-chain stack | Indexer, API, frontend, analytics, alerting | Markets |
| Upgrades & audits | Every protocol release must migrate and test every market | Markets × releases |
| Risk & governance | Bridge monitoring, collateral and cap reviews, incident response | Assets + bridge exposure |

**Revenue vs cost (90 days):** $0.19 of interest accrued, against _[core team: oracle $/feed/mo, batcher ADA/day/market, infra, amortized audit]_. The core team should publish these per-market figures before the vote.

## 6. Counterpoints

### 6.1 “EURC and PYUSD are growing. Don’t drop them now.”

Globally, both assets are growing (DefiLlama):

| Asset | Supply 2025-10 | Supply 2026-10 | YoY | Chains | **Supply on Cardano (wan-bridged)** | Of which on Liqwid |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EURC | $239M | $506M | **+112%** | 13 | **≈ $200** | 66% |
| PYUSD | $2.76B | $2.93B | +6% (peak $3.69B in Jan) | 19 | **≈ $199** | 42% |
| DAI | $5.14B | $4.75B | −8% | 49 | ≈ $7,984 | 26% |

EURC more than doubled across 13 chains over the year, yet Cardano still holds about $200 of it. Growth elsewhere has not reached Cardano through Wanchain. Liqwid already holds most of the tiny Cardano float, so the market can’t grow from inside Cardano either.

**How to handle it:** delisting can be reversed. If a native or canonical EURC/PYUSD issuance arrives on Cardano, for example a Circle- or Paxos-backed deployment, it can be listed fresh with a better risk profile than a bridged wrapper.

### 6.2 Bridge risk is real, as the Wanchain exploit showed

- On **20–21 Jul 2026** , the Wanchain Cardano↔BNB bridge was exploited.
  - The attacker drained about **515M NIGHT** , roughly 97% of the bridge’s NIGHT reserves, worth an estimated $9–13M.
  - BlockSec traced the root cause to a signature-reuse flaw in the bridge’s `TreasuryCheck` validator.
  - NIGHT fell 30–40%. Wanchain paused the affected routes, including the wanUSDC route. _[attach Wanchain notice]_

- All three bridged candidates (wanPYUSD, wanEURC, wanDAI) share the Wanchain policy `25c5de5f…f935`. Their value depends entirely on Wanchain’s custody and validators.
- **For a wrapped stablecoin that nobody borrows, bridge risk is all downside and earns nothing.** A frozen or drained bridge leaves Liqwid holding a depegged asset, possibly as collateral, plus an incident to manage.

### 6.3 “Then why keep wanUSDC and wanUSDT?”

They share the same bridge, but the economics are different. wanUSDC and wanUSDT carry about $894k of supply at 86–89% utilization and earn real revenue. Their bridge risk is paid for. The candidates’ bridge risk is not. Reviewing bridge concentration for wanUSDC and wanUSDT (caps, collateral factors, a path to native assets) is **out of scope** here and deserves its own proposal.

### 6.4 “$2.7k is too small to bother with.”

The size is exactly the point: delisting costs almost nothing in user impact, while each market keeps adding to operating and audit costs indefinitely.

## 7. Not Proposed

| Market | Reason |
| --- | --- |
| AGIX, COPI, WMT | Already `delisting` |
| SNEK2, STRIKE, LQ, POL | Borrow cap 0: collateral-only by design |
| SNEK2-USDCx, STRIKE-USDCx, SNEK2-ADA | Recent isolated pairs. Review in 90 days |
| ETH, IAG, ERG, MIN, SHEN, STRIKE-ADA | Small but borrowing is active. Watchlist |

## 8. Specification

For **PYUSD, EURC, DAI, USDM-USDA-MINSWAP-LP-STABLE** :

1. **Day 0:** set `delisting = true`. Block new supply and new borrows. Remove as collateral for new loans.
2. **Days 0–30:** repay, withdraw, and liquidate as usual. Show a front-end banner and announce on all channels.
3. **Day 30:** lower collateral factors step by step to close the remaining positions (10 dust wanDAI loans and 1 LP loan).
4. **Day 60:** stop the oracle feeds and batching. Keep a claim path for withdrawals open for at least 12 months.

## 9. Reproducibility

Every figure in this proposal can be regenerated from public endpoints (scripts available on demand):

| Script | Source | Produces |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `markets.mjs` | Liqwid `liqwid.data.markets` | Snapshot table |
| `history.mjs` | Liqwid `analytics.marketHistory(interval: DAY)` | §3 tables |
| `lp_onchain.mjs` | Koios `asset_info`, `asset_history`, `asset_addresses` | §4 |
| `stables.mjs`, `wan_supply.mjs` | DefiLlama stablecoins API + Koios | §6.1 |
| `charts.mjs` | All of the above | Charts |

## 10. Vote

- **FOR:** delist the four markets as specified.
- **AGAINST:** keep all markets as they are.
- **ABSTAIN**